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Must knowledge be grounded in epistemic foundations? 
 
 
By Damian E M Milton 
 
The nature of knowledge has been a problematic issue that has puzzled philosophers over 
centuries of enquiry.  Many definitions however, encompass ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ  ‘ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚƚƌƵĞ
ďĞůŝĞĨ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ‘'ĞƚƚŝĞƌĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶWƌŝƚĐŚĂƌĚ 2006) show many concerns regarding such 
a definition, a sound justification is usually seen as an essential component of what 
knowledge comprises of.  The structure of justification is however, a problematic area within 
epistemology, as when one is asked how they are justified in their belief one is limited to 
choose between three alternatives.  Firstly, that the belief is unsupported (and needs no 
further justification).  Secondly, that the belief is supported by an infinite chain of 
justification (with no supporting justification appearing more than on one occasion) and 
thirdly, that the belief is supported by a circular chain of justification.  The schools of 
thought that defend each of these answers are respectively called Foundationalism, 
Infinitism and Coherentism.  In this assignment, these positions will be compared and 
evaluated in terms of whether knowledge does need foundational beliefs in order to be 
justifiable. 
 
The Foundationalist position is that some beliefs do not require further justification, as they 
are self-justifying, thus any chain of justification stops at these foundational beliefs.  This 
position was famously espoused by Rene Descartes (cited in Pritchard 2006) who argued 
that foundational beliefs are those that are beyond doubt and are thus self-evidently true 
ĂŶĚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?  dŚĞ ĨĂŵŽƵƐ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĞƐĐĂƌƚĞƐ ? ďĞůŝĞĨ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ P ‘ĐŽŐŝƚŽĞƌŐŽƐƵŵ ? ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞĐŽƵůĚĚŽƵďƚŚŝƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƉƌŽǀĞƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŚĂƐ
to be alive to doubt it. 
 
Probably the leading exponent of the Coherentist approach was W. V. O. Quine (cited in 
Pritchard 2006).  Coherentism has a practicality in its application, as most beliefs held by 
ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚƵƐŝŶŐĂ ‘ǁĞď ?ŽĨŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞďƵŝůƚƵƉĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ-ǀŝĞǁ ? ? In 
this view, someone may follow an incorrect world view, yet be justified in following the only 
theoretical/evidential tools at their disposal.  Quine employs a scientific account of 
ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇ ǁŚĞƌĞ P  ‘EŽ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŝŵŵƵŶĞ ƚŽ ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ WƌŝƚĐŚĂƌĚ 2006: 38).  
Coherentists argue that if the circle of justification is sufficiently large enough and holds up 
to rebuttals that it can sustain a belief, yet Foundationalists would argue that no matter how 
large the circle is, it really does not provide support for a belief without some foundational 
principle. 
 
Infinitism by contrast to the other perspectives has been historically far less popular, yet has 
been recently advocated by Klein (1998).  <ůĞŝŶ ?Ɛ /ŶĨŝŶŝƚŝƐŵ ƌĞůŝĞƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚǁŽ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĨƌŽŵĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨŽŚĞƌĞŶƚŝƐŵ ?Ɛ ‘ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ-ďĞŐŐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨ
 ‘ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ ?WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨǀŽŝĚŝŶŐŝƌĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?W ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
Ă ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ-ďĞŐŐŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ ŽŚĞƌĞŶƚŝƐŵ ?  <ůĞŝŶ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ?ǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů
ĂŶĐĞƐƚƌǇ ?ƚŽŵĞĂŶƚŚe links in the chains of justification.  Klein states that if r is a reason for 
p, and q is a reason for r, then r is in the evidential ancestry of p, and q is in the evidential 
ancestry of both p and r.  The adherence of Infinitism to this principle allows it to avoid the 
circularity of the Coherentist. 
 
dŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŽ /ŶĨŝŶŝƚŝƐŵ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ?WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ ǀŽŝĚŝŶŐ ƌďŝƚƌĂƌŝŶĞƐƐ ?  ?W ? ? 
Klein argues that no ultimate foundational reason will serve as the arbitrary stopping point 
of the chain.  Every reason requires another reason.  These principles entail that the chains 
of justification must be unending and that no justification can be a reason for itself. 
 
/ŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐĨĂĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ?&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?This 
way of thinking puts too much emphasis on the infallibility of knowledge to be beyond doubt 
and error and thus one is left with very few beliefs that can be said to be self-justifying (if 
Klein is correct, none can).  One answer to this, is to be less stringent regarding the criteria 
ƵƐĞĚ ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂů ďĞůŝĞĨ ? ? ǇĞƚ ƚŚĞŶŽŶĞ ĨĂĐĞƐ ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ Ğǆplaining why such a 
belief should be seen as foundational in the first instance.  Another problem faced by the 
Foundationalist approach is how a foundational belief can provide a foundation for a non-
foundational belief, without also assuming an infallible logical connection between one and 
the other.  In defence of Foundationalism, Descartes did provide an irrefutable foundational 









<ůĞŝŶ ? W ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ‘&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ /ŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ZĞŐƌĞƐƐ ŽĨ ZĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? ?Philosophy and 
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